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Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions
Abstract
We propose two variants of a protocol that provides
users’ private information escrow capability bound to
multiple set of conditions in a federated single sign-on
environment using trusted platform module (TPM)
and secure processor technologies. The first variant
assumes the existence of a trusted anonymity revo-
cation manager, while the second variant does not.
Cryptographic techniques, such as identity-based re-
encryption and custodian-hiding encryption, are ap-
plied in our protocol. A performance analysis of
our protocol is provided to show that our protocol
achieves a better performance in comparison to the
existing anonymous credential approach. This is es-
pecially true when a user interacts with many service
providers in a session. The security properties pro-
vided by both variants of our protocol are discussed.
Keywords: privacy, conditional anonymity, anony-
mous credential, federated single sign-on
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario where a user ua goes to an on-
line shopping portal to do some purchases in a ses-
sion, including a prescription medicine from a ser-
vice provider X (SPx), a few toys from an SPy, and
other goods from other SPs. For privacy reasons, ua
can be anonymous. However, for accountability pur-
poses, some of ua’s personal identifiable information
(PII) may have to be revealed when certain conditions
are met - such as when the medicine ua purchased
was found to have serious previously-undetected side-
effects. Therefore, the stores with whom ua pur-
chased the goods have to make sure that ua’s PII
is correctly escrowed so that it can be revealed when
needed. We call this the conditional revelation of PII
(CRPI).
The existing anonymous credential system (ACS)
- such as (Bangerter et al. 2004) - provide the CRPI
capability through their PII-escrow operation. How-
ever, it suffers from a poor performance: if the user
ua makes purchases from r stores in a session, then
r-number of PII-escrow operations have to be per-
formed. This is because the PII-escrow operation
binds a user’s PIIs to a set of Conditions-X specific to
an SPx only. Due to the different nature of goods and
services offered between SPs, it is highly likely that
an SPx will have a different set of conditions to an-
other SPy. As a PII-escrow operation requires many
resources-intensive cryptographic operations (genera-
tion of commitments, encryptions, and execution of
zero-knowledge proof protocol), having to perform
such an operation multiple times in a session will eas-
ily result in a poor performance, thus reduced usabil-
ity to the users. This problem is aggravated for users
with limited-power devices.
The main contribution of this paper is a proposal
for a protocol that allows a user to bind her escrowed
PII to multiple set of conditions while only having
to perform the resources-intensive PII-escrow opera-
tion once. We achieve this by extending the existing
ACS into a federated single sign-on (FSSO) environ-
ment, using trusted platform module (TPM) and se-
cure processor technologies. The main advantage of
our protocol is that, given the same scenario above,
it achieves a significantly better performance as com-
pared to using the existing approach (Bangerter et al.
2004). Section 7 provides a comparison of our proto-
col with the existing one.
Background Anonymous credential systems - such
as (Bangerter et al. 2004) - provide many privacy
enhancing features, including anonymous authenti-
cation (the ability to prove that a user is ‘known’
and certified by a trusted certificate authority with-
out revealing the user’s identity), selective disclosure
of personal identifiable information (PII) in a certifi-
cate without revealing the whole certificate, condi-
tional revelation of PII, and many others. This paper
uses one of the most important capabilities of an ACS:
CRPI.
Consider the scenario above. When ua do not trust
SPx, or SPy, or any other SPs in that portal, pro-
viding CRPI can be problematic: ua might provide
some PIIs to the SPs prior to purchasing goods, but
this means that ua is no longer anonymous. Besides,
ua can always provide bogus PIIs to the SPs. The
PII-escrow operation provided by the existing ACS
(Bangerter et al. 2004) provides a method to address
this problem by escrowing ua’s PII to an anonymity
revocation manager ARM as follows: ua encrypts the
required PII under a set of Conditions-X using the
ARM public key and gives the ciphertext to SPx.
The value of Conditions-X is part of the input of the
encryption process. Then, ua and SPx engage in a
zero-knowledge proof (PK) protocol to convince SPx
that the provided ciphertext contains valid PII of ua
which have been certified by a trusted certificate au-
thority (this also implies anonymous authentication)
and that it can be decrypted by the ARM . To re-
veal the PII, the ARM has to be convinced that the
Conditions-X are satisfied before decrypting the ci-
phertext. The decryption process requires theARM ’s
private key as well as the same Conditions-X as used
during the encryption process (see Appendix A.1 for
more detailed explanation).
However, as mentioned earlier, such a PII-escrow
operations requires the execution of many cryp-
tographic operations which consume a substantial
amount of computing resources. Having to perform
such PII escrow with many SPs will easily result in
a decreased performance and, subsequently, poor us-
ability of the system to the user.
One method to improve the performance and us-
ability of ACS is to use them in the context of the ex-
isting federated single sign-on (FSSO) systems, such
as SAML 2.0 (OASIS 2005a) and WS-Federation
(Lockhart et al. 2006). Such an approach has been
proposed in (Suriadi, Foo & Josang 2008). In essence,
an FSSO system allows a user to authenticate once to
an identity provider (IdP) and then proceeds to access
services from any service providers (SPs) in the fed-
eration (from the scenario above, the shopping portal
can be the IdP, while SPx and SPy are the SPs). It is
during this authentication stage that a user can per-
form the PII escrow operation (recall that the process
of PII escrow also implies anonymous authentication).
When an SP requires the user’s authentication infor-
mation, it will contact the IdP, to whom the user has
been authenticated, to obtain an assertion containing
the user’s authentication information. If PII-escrow
is used, the IdP, in the subsequent assertions issued
to SPs, can simply include a statement stating that
a set of user’s PII have been escrowed and that they
can be revealed when a certain set of Conditions are
satisfied. By doing so, we can significantly reduce
the number of resource-intensive cryptographic oper-
ations that PII-escrow operation required. Thus, in
addition to improving performance, users also bene-
fit from the convenience that FSSO provides, which
results in an improved usability, while still retaining
the privacy protections from the use of anonymous
credential. An IdP can also play the role of an ARM ,
or they can be different entities.
Problem The PII escrow mechanism described ear-
lier binds the encrypted PII to a set of Conditions-
SP-X which is only valid between a user ua and a
service provider SPx. Such one-to-one binding be-
tween encrypted PII and SPx is problematic when
applied in an FSSO environment: when A goes to
another SPy, a different set of Conditions-SP-Y may
be used (Conditions-SP-X 6= Conditions-SP-Y ), and
thus rendering the previously encrypted PII (bound
to Conditions-SP-Y ) unusable. Of course ua and SPx
can perform the whole PII escrow operation again -
including the commitments generation, encryption of
the PII, and PK operations. However, this defeats
the performance, convenience, and usability benefits
gained from using FSSO.
Therefore, the main problem to address is how to
bind a set of escrowed PII to multiple set of condi-
tions (which may or may not have been determined
prior to the start of a session) as efficient as possible
in an environment where IdPs, SPs, and users are ma-
licious. This issue is not addressed in (Suriadi, Foo
& Josang 2008). We henceforth call this problem the
multiple conditions problem.
Proposed Solution In this paper, we propose a
protocol (with two variants) to address the multiple
conditions problem. In the first approach, we pro-
pose the use of an identity-based encryption-proxy re-
encryption scheme (IBEPRE), such as (Green & Ate-
niese 2007), in combination with the ACS (Bangerter
et al. 2004). By re-encryption, we mean the trans-
formation of a ciphertext C that was encrypted un-
der a party X’s public key to another ciphertext C ′
which a different party Y can decrypt using her pri-
vate key without the entity who performs the re-
encryption (the proxy) learning the value of the plain-
text. IBEPRE allows arbitrary string (such as the
Conditions) string to be used as a public encryption
key. Therefore, conceptually, we should be able to
re-encrypt a set of escrowed PII encrypted under a
Conditions-SP-X to another ciphertext encrypted un-
der Conditions-SP-Y. The main advantage of this ap-
proach is that it only requires minimal computations
from the user’s side, thus, meeting the efficiency and
usability requirements.
However, the main drawback of using any identity-
based encryption schemes (including IBEPRE) is that
a single entity, known as the private key generator
(PKG), can generate the private key for any given
public key, and thus is able to decrypt any encrypted
(or re-encrypted) messages (Baek et al. 2004). In our
case, we can easily extend the role of an ARM to in-
clude that of a PKG. We henceforth call this problem
the trusted ARM problem. When there is a trusted
ARM , the solution just described can be applied.
Otherwise, we need a different solution.
Therefore, we propose a second solution which
combines the ACS with the custodian hiding encryp-
tion scheme (UCH) (Liu et al. 2005) to address the
multiple-conditions and the trusted ARM problems.
In this approach, we do not assume the existence of
a single trusted ARM . Instead, such trust is dis-
tributed amongst n referees.
In both approaches, we take advantage of the the
recent advancement in the Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM) technology (TCG 2007), along with secure
processor technology that is already provided by most
of the current processors, such as Intel Trusted Exe-
cution Technology (Intel 2007) (we henceforth call a
TPM platform that uses secure processor technology
as an extended TPM platform). Using an extended
TPM platform, we can perform a secure execution of
sensitive codes with provable isolated execution prop-
erty: the ability to prove that a given output is the re-
sult of correct execution of a set of integrity-protected
codes based on a verified given input (see (McCune
et al. 2008) for details). As we shall see in section 4
and 5, the provable isolated execution property is very
useful in providing a reasonable assurance of a user’s
‘correct behaviour’ even when the user is assumed to
be malicious.
In both variants of our protocol, we show that a
better performance is achieved as compared to using
the existing ACS approach alone, especially when a
user needs to interact with many SPs in a session.
Contributions To summarize, the contributions of
this paper are: (1) two variants of a protocol to en-
able secure PII-escrow bound to multiple conditions
(PIEMC) in an FSSO environment (we henceforth
call such a protocol FSSO-PIEMC): the first one as-
suming the existence of a trusted ARM , while the
second one does not make such an assumption, and
(2) a performance analysis of FSSO-PIEMC to show
how our protocol achieves a better performance in
comparison to the existing approach.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 de-
tails the security requirements and the threat envi-
ronment of an FSSO-PIEMC system. Section 3 de-
scribes the notations used and a brief description of
the cryptographic schemes that are used in this pa-
per (more detailed explanations on the cryptographic
schemes used and TPM technologies are provided in
Appendix A). Section 4 details the first variant of the
FSSO-PIEMC protocol, assuming the existence of a
trusted ARM . Section 5 details the second variant of
the FSSO-PIEMC, without a trusted ARM . Section
6 provides an informal analysis of the security prop-
erties in both variants of the FSSO-PIEMC protocol.
Section 7 analyses the performance of FSSO-PIEMC,
and compares it to the existing approach. Conclusion
and future work are provided in section 8.
2 Requirements and Threats
The main entities in FSSO-PIEMC are: users (U),
IdPs, SPs, and ARM , and a set of referees R. The
referees are only used in the second variant of the
FSSO-PIEMC (without trusted ARM) to assess if a
given set of Conditions is satisfied or not.
2.1 Requirements
The security requirements for an FSSO system
that respects users’ privacy have been detailed in
(Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2006).1 Moreover, the re-
quirements for a system that applies ACS while re-
moving the need of a single trusted ARM has been
proposed in (Suriadi, Foo & Smith 2008b,a). In this
paper, we focus on the requirements needed for an
FSSO-PIEMC system, therefore, we will extend some
of the requirements from the cited references, and
add a new one - multiple conditions - for the FSSO-
PIEMC environment:
Main requirements:
• Multiple conditions: a user’s escrowed PII must
be able to be bound to multiple sets of conditions
from various SPs in a session. These conditions
may be determined prior, or after, the start of a
session.
• Zero-knowledge: ARM , IdPs, referees, and
unauthorized SPs must not be able to learn
the value of the escrowed PII. Only authorized
SPs can learn the values of the escrowed PII.
By authorized, we mean the situation whereby
the set of Conditions associated to a particu-
lar escrowed PII are satisfied. This requirement
implies the confidentiality, conditional release,
and revocation properties detailed in (Bhargav-
Spantzel et al. 2006).
• Enforceable conditions fulfillment : this property
can be broken down into two types:
– Direct Enforcement of Conditions means
that revocation of the escrowed PII is de-
pendent on actions which are directly re-
lated to conditions fulfillment (such as in in
e-cash applications (Davida et al. 1997))
– Indirect Enforcement of Conditions means
that the fulfillment of Conditions has to be
performed ‘manually’, however, once such
fulfillment of conditions is confirmed, cer-
tain actions can be performed (such as de-
crypting a ciphertext) that will result in the
revelation of the escrowed PII.
This requirement is used in (Suriadi, Foo &
Smith 2008b), and it is similar to the privacy
policy, obligations, restrictions, and enforcement
properties detailed in (Bhargav-Spantzel et al.
2006).
• Authenticated PII escrow : while the value of the
escrowed PII are not known (anonymous), the
recipient of the escrowed PII (such as an IdP)
has to be convinced that when the escrowed PII
are recovered, they will reveal the correct infor-
mation. This property is extended from the au-
thenticated user property used in (Suriadi, Foo
& Smith 2008b). This property encompasses
the anonymity, verifiability, integrity, and confi-
dentiality properties in (Bhargav-Spantzel et al.
2006)
1In (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2006), they call such system the
universal user-centric system
• Conditions-Abuse resistant : the FSSO-PIEMC
should be designed such that it is secure from
malicious IdPs, SPs, and referees who may try
to ‘down grade’ the security of the system by
binding a set of escrowed PII with easy-to-fulfill
conditions. Similarly, FSSO-PIEMC should also
resist an attempt by users to bind a set of es-
crowed PII with a set of conditions which may be
hard or impossible to satisfied. This requirement
is extended from the more generic Abuse resis-
tant property defined in (Suriadi, Foo & Smith
2008b).
Desirable requirements:
• Minimum on-line computations: while online
cryptographic-related computations may not be
avoided altogether, we need to keep them to a
minimum. Therefore, we need to (1) reduce the
number of computations required, and (2) offload
as many computations as possible to off-line pro-
cessing.
• User-centric: the revocation of a user’s escrowed
PII can only be successfully performed with the
knowledge (and possibly direct participation) of
the user. The user-centric property is beneficial
if users are honest. If users are aware that a
certain PII of theirs are being revoked in an un-
authorized manner, they can immediately take
corrective actions. However, this property may
not be desirable in some cases, such as terror-
ism activities detection and prevention. This re-
quirement encompasses the user-in-the-middle,
user-consent, and user notification properties in
(Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2006), and it is used in
(Suriadi, Foo & Smith 2008b)
• (non)-Forward secrecy : The nature of FSSO
means that, even with the use of anonymous
credential, IdP will be able to track an anony-
mous user’s activities within a session. However,
once a user’s PII is revoked, we may or may not
want to link the revoked PII to a set of past ses-
sions. If the forward secrecy property is not sup-
ported, then sessions will be linkable. Linkable
sessions might be more practical (especially for
security investigation purpose), however, unlink-
able sessions property provides a better privacy
for users. This property is called the events link-
ability property in (Suriadi, Foo & Smith 2008b),
and it is similar to the unlinkability property de-
tailed in (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2006).
2.2 Threats
In this paper, we consider threats that can be ex-
ecuted by either the users, IdPs, SPs, ARM , and
referees. Other threats which have been addressed
in the existing FSSO standards, such as replay of
assertions attack - see (OASIS 2005b), are not con-
sidered. Therefore, the threat environment for the
FSSO-PIEMC protocol is as follows:
• Malicious users who may provide false PII (for
escrow) and may attempt to cause unsuccessful
revocation of the escrowed PII even when Con-
ditions are satisfied.
• Malicious IdPs and SPs who will attempt to re-
veal the escrowed PII in an un-authorized man-
ner. However, as is common in an FSSO model,
SPs trust IdPs.
• Honest referees (Rh ⊂ R), with a small subset
of dishonest referees (Rdh ⊂ R) who may also
attempt to reveal the escrowed PII in an un-
authorized manner.
• Honest ARM for FSSO-PIEMC with trusted
ARM (section 4). For the FSSO-PIEMCE with-
out trusted ARM (section 5), no ARM is in-
volved.
• Collusion: possible between IdPs, SPs, and Rdh.
However, collusion between U and IdPs, SPs,
ARM , or Rdh is unlikely due to conflicting in-
terests: U wants to protect the PII from being
revealed, while IdPs, SPs, ARM , and Rdh have
the exact opposite interest
3 Notations and Concepts
ma, ...me are plaintext PII. An encryption of a
PII ma using an encryption scheme under an
entity i’s public encryption key and a label
Label is denoted as: Cipher
Kipub−scheme,Label
scheme−ma
=
Encscheme(ma;Label;K
i
pub−scheme). Only the en-
tity i who has the corresponding private key
Kipriv−scheme can decrypt and recover ma =
Decscheme(Cipher
Kipub−scheme,Label
scheme−ma
;Kipriv−scheme).
A signature of an entity i over a message ma
can only be produced by using i’s signing key
(which is private): S
Kisign
ma = Sign(ma;K
i
sign). This
signature can be verified by anybody using the
signature verification key of i (which is public):
V erifySign(S
Kisign
ma ;ma;K
i
verify) = 1 (valid) or 0 (in-
valid).
A commitment of PII ma is generated using a
Commit algorithm, with a random value r: cma =
Commit(ma, r). A commitment should be hiding
(does not reveal any computational information on
ma) and binding (computationally infeasible to find
another mj and r
′
as inputs to the same Commit
algorithm that gives a value cmj = cma).
A zero knowledge proof interactive protocol (PK)
executed between a Prover and a Verifier is denoted as
follows: PK{(ma): F (ma,mb...me) = 1}. The PII on
the left of the colon ma is the PII that a Prover needs
to prove the knowledge of such that the statements on
the right-side, F (ma,mb...me) = 1, is correct. A veri-
fier will not learn the value of the PII on the left hand
side of the colon, while other parameters are known.
A PK may involve one or more message exchange(s).
At the end of a PK execution, a verifier will (or will
not) be convinced that the prover has the knowledge
of ma without the verifier learning its value.
An ACS - such as (Bangerter et al. 2004) - uses
many PK to provide its privacy-enhancing features,
such as CRPI. A certificate Cert in an ACS is a sig-
nature of a certificate issuer CertIssuer over a collec-
tion of PII. A Cert is private to the user. To provide
CRPI, a user first commits the PII to escrow (say ma
contained in a certificate Cert), then encrypts it using
the verifiable encryption (VE) scheme (Camenisch &
Shoup 2003a). Then, a PK is executed between the
user and the recipient of the ciphertext to prove that
the ciphertext correctly hidesma as certified in Certa.
More details on ACS are provided in Appendix A.1.
In IBEPRE schemes - such as (Chu & Tzeng 2007,
Green & Ateniese 2007), public key is just a label,
known as id. We denote an IBEPRE encryption of a
message ma under a label id1 as Cipher
id1
IBEPRE−ma
.
To decrypt, the private key skid1 has to be extracted
from a PKG (who has the master secret key msk).
A re-encryption key rkid1→id2 (which can be gener-
ated if one knows skid1 , id1, and id2) is needed to re-
encrypt Cipherid1IBEPRE−ma into Cipher
id2
IBEPRE−ma
.
The entity performing such a re-encryption does not
learn the value of ma. See Appendix A.2 for a more
detailed description of IBEPRE scheme.
A universal custodian-hiding - UCH(k, t, n) - en-
cryption scheme (Liu et al. 2005) allows one to en-
crypt a message ma such that any k members of a
subgroup T (of t members) have to work together to
decrypt it. The subgroup T is formed spontaneously
by the encryptor of ma from the main group N con-
sisting of n members (1 ≤ k ≤ t ≤ n). The identities
of the members of T are hidden from the recipient of
such an encryption. An encryptor can form the sub-
group T consisting of different members with each en-
cryption. A UCH(k, t, n) encryption ofma will result
in t well-formed ciphertext pieces encrypted using the
corresponding public keys of members of T , and n− t
random values chosen from specific domains such that
they are indistinguishable from the well-formed ones:
Cipher
K
si
pub−UCH
,Conditions
UCH(k,t,n)−ma
+ randomri (for i = 1...n,
s ∈ T , and r ∈ [1, n] \ T ). See Appendix A.3 for a
more detailed description.
To verify that a user is using a genuine TPM in the
most privacy-respecting manner, a Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) protocol, as proposed in (Brickell
et al. 2004), must be used. A successful execution of
DAA protocol convinces the verifier that it is inter-
acting with a genuine TPM platform without learning
the ‘identity’ of the platform. Instead, a pair of per-
session Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is generated
which can be used by the TPM as its authenticated
signing key to sign TPM-generated messages - such
as Platform Configuration Register (PCR) value - for
that session only (PCR values contain the hash values
of modules loaded in a secure execution area). There-
fore, interactions with the same TPM over multiple
sessions are unlinkable, hence better privacy.
The provable isolated execution property provided
by an extended TPM plaform allows one to prove
that a given output is the result of correct execu-
tion of a set of integrity-protected codes based on a
given input which can also be verified. The genera-
tion of such proofs only require a simple signature of
the TPM PCR value, input, output, and other pa-
rameters. Appendix A.4 provides more explanation
of TPM and its related technologies. Readers who
are interested in the details should consult (McCune
et al. 2008).
4 FSSO-PIEMC with a trusted ARM
In this section, we detail the FSSO-PIEMC protocol
which combines the ACS (Bangerter et al. 2004) with
an IBEPRE scheme, using extended TPM technology.
Our FSSO-PIEMC protocol is designed such that any
IBEPRE schemes respecting the definition provided
in (Green & Ateniese 2007) can be used. Readers who
are not familiar with the mentioned cryptographic
schemes and technologies should refer to the expla-
nations provided in Appendix A.1, A.2, and A.4.
Overview We divide FSSO-PIEMC into few
stages: setup, PII escrow, key escrow, multiple bind-
ing, and revocation. The setup only has to be per-
formed once. The PII escrow, and key escrow stages
only have to be performed once per session. The mul-
tiple binding stage can be performed multiple times
in a session as needed. The revocation stage is only
performed when an SP believes that a set of condi-
tions is satisfied, thus needing the user PII to be re-
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Figure 1: FSSO-PIEMC with trusted ARM
vealed. We assume the existence of a trusted ARM
who will also perform the role of a PKG. This as-
sumption is removed later in our second variant of
the FSSO-PIEMC protocol detailed in section 5.
Assume we need to escrow d-number of a user’s
PII. We leave the original PII-escrow operation the
same, except that in FSSO-PIEMC, instead of en-
crypting the PII to an ARM , we use a one-time
user-generated keys for the verifiable encryption (VE)
scheme (Camenisch & Shoup 2003a). The encryp-
tions of the d PII are given to IdP for escrow. Then,
the private portion of the VE one-time key is escrowed
as follows: the user’s extended TPM platform will
perform a provable isolated execution of Module1 -
given the public key portion of the generated one-
time VE keys, perform an IBEPRE encryption of the
corresponding VE one-time private key under a con-
dition string Conditions - see Table 1. Then, the en-
crypted key is sent to the ARM for escrow, along with
the proof to show that the ciphertext is the result of
a correct execution of Module1. When the escrowed
PII needs to be bound to a separate Conditions2, the
IdP will request the ARM to perform an IBEPRE of
the IBEPRE-encrypted VE private key.
We require that a condition string Conditions to
contain information about the identity of the SP to
whom the conditions apply, a unique one-time ran-
dom value, and a list of conditions that must be sat-
isfied before the associated encrypted message can be
recovered. The details of our FSSO-PIEMC protocol
assuming a trusted ARM are as follows (see Figure
1):
Setup A user ua obtains a certificate Cert contain-
ing PII ma...mi from a certificate issuer CertIssuer.
The PII certified by CertIssuer is accepted by the
IdPs and SPs in the federation. To verify the is-
sued certificate, the CertIssuer’s signature verifica-
tion key KCertIssuerverify is used.
PII escrow An FSSO session is started when a user
ua needs to access services from a service provider
SP1 who in turn requires the IdP to escrow some
of ua’s PII under a set of conditions Conditions-SP1
(which can be freshly negotiated per session, or pre-
agreed beforehand). A start of a session triggers the
start of a PII escrow stage. While the existing im-
plementation of PII escrow in (Bangerter et al. 2004)
binds a set of conditions to the encryptions of those
PII directly, in FSSO-PIEMC, such binding will only
be reflected during the key escrow stage. At the PII
escrow stage, we can use a generic condition string
stating that ‘decryption of these PII should only be
performed pending a successful recovery of the asso-
ciated decryption key that is escrowed in the follow-
ing key-escrow stage’. We denote this condition as
GenCond. The IdP will not be able to decrypt these
escrowed PII because it does not have the decryption
key.
1. SP1 generates a signed request for PII ma...mc
to be escrowed to the IdP. This request mes-
sage includes the standard information dictated
by the FSSO protocol used in the federation, as
well as Conditions-SP1. This request message is
redirected through ua to the IdP.
2. The IdP verifies the request from SP1. If valid,
it will contact the user to start the PII escrow
operation.
3. User ua generates:
(a) one-time VE encryption key: Kupub−V E ,
Kupriv−V E .
(b) the commitments ca...cc for PII ma...mc re-
spectively
(c) encryptions of PII ma...mc,
e.g. Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
=
Enc(ma, GenCond;K
u
pub−V E)
4. ua sends K
u
pub−V E , Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
to the IdP
5. ua and IdP engage in a PK to prove that the
commitments ca...cc hide PIIma...mc which have
been certified in Cert issued by CertIssuer.
This PK also proves that Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
are the correct encryptions of PII
ma...mc w.r.t K
u
pub−V E . The value of ca...cc are
given to the IdP as part of the PK procedure.
PK{(Cert, ma...mc) :
ca = Commit(ma, r) ∧ ...cc = Commit(mc, r)(1)
∧V erifySign(ma, .., mi; K
CertIssuer
verify ) = 1 (2)
∧Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
=
EncV E(ma; GenCond; K
u
pub−V E) ∧ ... (3)
∧Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
=
EncV E(mc; GenCond; K
u
pub−V E)} (4)
6. After a successful execution of the
above PK, the IdP stores Kupub−V E
and Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
,and
Conditions-SP1.
We cannot simply substitute the execution of the
above PK protocol with the use of an extended TPM
platform. This is because at this stage, the IdP does
not have any data that can be used as a source of
a valid input to a TPM module (garbage-in garbage-
out problem). In our protocol, since it is the user who
generated and gave Kupub−V E to the IdP, the IdP has
to verify that the given Kupub−V E is correct in rela-
tion to the encrypted PII. The execution of the PK
during the PII escrow stage above provides such a ver-
ification of Kupub−V E (that it is the correct encryption
key used to encrypt ma...mc). Therefore, from this
point onwards, we can use Kupub−V E and other pub-
licly known value as inputs to a module to be executed
by an extended TPM.
Key escrow The public key parameters
params-IBEPRE for the IBEPRE scheme used is
known to all participants in the federation.
1. The IdP signs Conditions-SP1 and sends
S
KARMsign
Conditions-SP1
+ Conditions-SP1 in a redirec-
tion message through the user to a chosen ARM .
2. The ARM verifies S
KARMsign
Conditions-SP1
. If valid,
it stores Conditions-SP1 and continues. Other-
wise, halt.
3. ua and ARM engage in a DAA protocol to ver-
ify that the user is using a valid TPM platform
and to generate a pair of AIK keys, denoted as
KTPM−uaverify−AIK , K
TPM−ua
sign−AIK
(a) As AIK should only be used to sign mes-
sages generated internally by a TPM, ua’s
TPM should also generate a one-time sign-
ing key to sign messages from ua (but
not TPM-internally generated messages):
Kuaverify, K
ua
sign. The user’s TPM can send
Kuaverify + S
K
T P M−ua
sign−AIK
K
ua
verify
to the IdP for verifi-
cation.
4. ua runs Module1 on her extended TPM platform
to perform an IBEPRE encryption of Kupriv−V E
under Conditions-SP1 - see Table 1 for the de-
tails of Module1. This module will generate an
output: CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
5. The platform should generate the proof of correct
execution of Module1. This proof would contain
information on the extended TPM ’s PCR values
(before and after execution) calculated from the
value of Module1, the inputs, output, and other
necessary information. This proof is signed using
KTPM−uasign−AIK . See (McCune et al. 2008) for details
of how such proof is generated.
6. The TPM proof + CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
are
sent to the ARM .
7. The ARM verifies the TPM proof. If
valid, the ARM stores Conditions-SP1 +
CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
, and sends a signed
CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
to the IdP
8. The IdP verifies the ARM signature on
CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
. If valid, it generates
a one-time pseudonym pseudoa to identify the
user for that particular FSSO session only
9. The IdP also stores pseudoa, and
links it with CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
,
Kupub−V E , Conditions-SP1, and
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
.
10. The IdP then sends a signed response message
back to SP1. Included in the response are
pseudoa, Cipher
Conditions−SP1
IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
, Conditions-
SP1, Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
, the iden-
tity of the chosen ARM , and other messages
specified by the FSSO protocol used.
11. SP1 verifies the response message from the IdP.
If valid, SP1 now has the necessary data such
that when Conditions-SP1 are satisfied, ma...mc
can be recovered with the help of the ARM .
We might be able to remove the key escrow stage
and have the user’s extended TPM platform directly
perform a provable isolated execution of IBEPRE en-
cryptions of the user’s PII hidden in those commit-
ments which have been proven to hide the correct cer-
tified PII (from the execution of the PK during the
PII-escrow stage). However, this approach is not scal-
able: assuming that in a session, d-number of PII are
escrowed, when these escrowed PII need to be bound
to another conditions, we now need to do d IBEPRE
re-encryptions. With key escrow, we only need to per-
form the re-encryption of the VE private key, thus it
is more efficient.
Another advantage of having the key escrow stage
is that we can improve efficiency by performing the
PII escrow stage even before the start of a session
(only step 3 to 6 of the PII escrow, moving step 1 and
2 of the PII escrow stage to the key escrow stage). A
user can escrow some commonly needed PII which are
most likely to be escrowed before a session is started.
This effectively ‘saves up’ a collection of escrowed PII
to be used for future sessions. When a session is
started between a user and an SP, the user only needs
to tell the IdP which one-time Kupub−V E to use, and
they can go straight to the key escrow stage.
Input Kupub−V E , Conditions,
params-IBEPRE
Process P1.1. Retrieve Kupriv−V E
P1.2. Verify that Kupriv−V E is the
correct private key for the
input value Kupub−V E
P1.3. If P1.2 returns true, generate
CipherConditionsIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
.
Otherwise, return an error
Output CipherConditionsIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
or error
Table 1: Module1 -IBEPRE encryption of VE private
key
Multiple Conditions Binding This stage is
started when the user ua goes to another SP2 who
also needs the escrowed PII but this time bound to a
different set of conditions. Depending on the imple-
mentation, ua and SP2 can negotiate the Conditions-
SP2 under which the escrowed PII can be revoked, or,
they could use the pre-agreed Conditions-SP2.
1. SP2 generates a signed request for ua’s escrowed
PII ma...mc to be bound to Conditions-SP2.
This request message include the standard re-
quest message dictated according to the respec-
tive FSSO protocol used in the federation, as well
as Conditions-SP2.
2. The IdP verifies the request from SP2. From
this request, the IdP will also detect that it has
an open authenticated session with a user known
as pseudoa.
2
3. The IdP retrieves Conditions-SP1 associated
with pseudoa, and sends a signed re-encryption
request to the ARM by sending Conditions-SP1
and Conditions-SP2’.
4. The ARM verifies the request, and checks if it
has the same Conditions-SP1. If not, stops.
5. To verify that the IdP has not given an invalid
Conditions-SP2’ to the ARM , the ARM pre-
pares a message multiple-bind = Conditions-SP1
+ Conditions-SP2’, and generates a signature
over multiple-bind.
6. The ARM sends S
KARMsign
multiple−bind to ua
7. The user ua, who knows Conditions-SP1 and
Conditions-SP2 verifies S
KARMsign
multiple−bind, and if
valid, sends a signed ‘OK’ message using Kuaverify
to the ARM .
8. The ARM verifies the response from
the user. If it is valid, it then re-
trieves CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
, and re-
encrypts it under Conditions-SP2 to gen-
erate CipherConditions−SP2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
(the ARM
can do the re-encryption as it knows
CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
, msk, Conditions-
SP1, and Conditions-SP2 )
9. The ARM stores Conditions-SP2 +
CipherConditions−SP2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
, and sends a signed
CipherConditions−SP2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
to the IdP
10. The IdP verifies the ARM ’s signature over
CipherConditions−SP2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
. If valid, it then
sends a signed response message back to
SP2. Included in the response are pseudoa,
CipherConditions−SP2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
+ Conditions-SP2,
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
, the identity of
the ARM , and other messages specified by the
FSSO protocol used.
11. SP2 verifies the response returned from the
IdP. If valid, then SP2 knows that ma...mc can
be recovered with the help of the ARM when
Conditions-SP2 are satisfied
Revocation When an SP, say SP1, believes that
Conditions-SP1 are satisfied, it will start the revoca-
tion stage:
1. SP sends a signed Conditions-SP1 to the ARM
2. The ARM verifies the message from SP and
checks if it has the same Conditions-SP1’ stored.
If so, it checks if the SP1 it is talking to is
the same as the identity of SP1′ as stated in
Conditions− SP1′.
2The IdP can detect such an open authenticated session with
pseudoa because in the existing FSSO protocols, the request mes-
sage that SP2 generated earlier is actually sent through a redi-
rection from the user to the IdP, thus some authenticated session
information (such as cookies) can be passed along to the IdP from
the user machine
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Figure 2: FSSO-PIEMC without trusted ARM
3. If valid, the ARM then verifies if the conditions
included in Conditions− SP1′ are satisfied.
4. If the policies are satisfied, then the ARM ex-
tracts skConditions−SP1 which is the private key
for Conditions-SP1.
5. ARM sends skConditions−SP1 to SP1, who can
then decrypt CipherConditions−SP1IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
to re-
cover Kupriv−V E , and then use K
u
priv−V E to re-
cover Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
.
5 FSSO-PIEMC without trusted ARM
The above protocol puts too much trust on the ARM
- who is also the PKG - to behave honestly. If the
ARM is malicious, then users are not protected (as
the ARM can easily decrypt all of the re-encrypted
Kupriv−V E and obtain the corresponding PII). In this
section, the second variant of our FSSO-PIEMC is
detailed whereby no trusted ARM is used.
Overview The setup and PII escrow stage are the
same. During the multiple binding stage, the user’s
extended TPM platform will perform an execution
of Module2: given Kupub−V E , a set of conditions,
and other public parameters for the UCH encryp-
tion scheme, perform an encryption of Kupriv−V E for
n referees under the given conditions. The encrypted
Kupriv−V E is then sent to the IdP, who will in turn pass
it on to the SP, along with pseudoa, and other nec-
essary information. During revocation, the SP sends
the encrypted Kupriv−V E to the n referees who will
then verify if all the necessary conditions are satis-
fied, and if so, help the SP to recoverKupriv−V E . With
Kupriv−V E recovered, the SP can recover the escrowed
PII.
Setup and PII Escrow No changes
Key Escrow Assume a similar scenario to the one
used in section 4: an SP1 needs to bind a set of es-
crowed PII to Conditions-SP1. For a group of referees
R consisting of n referees, each of the referees public
encryption keys Krefipub−UCH are publicly known. See
Figure 2.
1. ua and IdP engage in a DAA protocol to ver-
ify that the user is using a valid TPM plat-
form and to establish a one-time AIK key pair
(KTPM−uaverify−AIK , K
TPM−ua
sign−AIK), as well as one-time
user signing key Kuaverify, K
ua
sign to be used for
that session.
2. ua spontaneously forms a designated group T
consisting of t referees from a group of all ref-
erees R (T ⊂ R)
3. ua runs Module2 on her extended TPM
platform - see Table 2 for details. This
module will generate an output ψ =
Cipher
K
refsi
pub−UCH
,Conditions−SP1
UCH(t,t,n)−Ku
priv−V E
+ randomri
(for s ∈ T , and r ∈ [1, n] \ T , i = 1...n)
4. ua’s platform generates the proof of correct
execution of Module2, signs the proof using
KTPM−uasign−AIK , and sends ψ, and the proof to the
IdP.
5. After a successful verification of the proof, the
IdP generates a one-time pseudonym pseudoa to
identify the user for that particular FSSO session
only.
6. The IdP also stores pseudoa, and links it to ψ,
Kupub−V E , and Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
.
7. The IdP then sends a response mes-
sage back to SP1. Included in the re-
sponse are pseudoa, ψ, Conditions-SP1,
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
, and other
messages specified by the FSSO protocol used.
8. SP1 verifies the response returned from the IdP.
If valid, then SP1 knows that ma...mc can be
recovered, with the help of the referees, when
Conditions-SP1 are satisfied.
Input t (size of T ), n (size of R), Kupub−V E ,
Kipub−UCH (i = 1...n), Conditions
Process P2.1. Retrieve Kupriv−V E
P2.2. Verify that Kupriv−V E is the
private key for the input Kupub−V E
P2.3. For s ∈ T , generates
Cipher
K
refsi
,Conditions
pub−UCH
UCH(t,t,n)−Ku
priv−V E
P2.4. For r ∈ [1, n] \ T , generates
randomri
Output Cipher
K
refsi
,Conditions
pub−UCH
UCH(t,t,n)−Ku
priv−V E
+
randomri
Table 2: Module2 - UCH encryption of Kupriv−V E
Multiple Binding When the user goes to another
SP2 who needs to bind the user’s escrowed PII to an-
other set of conditions Conditions-SP2, similar oper-
ations as those in the key escrow stage are performed,
with the exception of step 1 which does not have to
be performed again as the generated AIK key pair
and the user signing key pair are valid throughout
the session. In step 5 and 6, the IdP this time will
use the generated pseudoa from the key escrow stage,
instead of creating a new one.
Revocation When an SP (say SP2) believes that
Conditions-SP2’ are satisfied, it will start the revo-
cation stage:
1. SP2 retrieves ψ associated with Conditions-SP2’
2. For i = 1...n, s ∈ T , and r ∈
[1, n] \ T , SP2 sends Conditions-SP2’ +
(Cipher
K
refsi
pub−UCH
,Conditions−SP2
UCH(t,t,n)−Ku
priv−V E
or randomri)
to the respective n referees (we assume the use
of authenticated and confidentiality-protected
channel between SP2 and the referees)
3. Each referee checks if the identity of the SP2′
it is talking to is the same as the one included
in the given Conditions-SP2’. If this is not the
case, stops.
4. Each referees verifies if the conditions included
in Conditions-SP2’ are satisfied.
5. If the policies are satisfied, then each referee de-
crypts the given ciphertext pieces:
(a) As part of the decryption algorithm in (Liu
et al. 2005), each refi (i ∈ T ) will be able
to verify that it has a well-formed ciphertext
piece. Thus, the decryption process will re-
sult in a share P iKu
priv−V E
. Sends P iKu
priv−V E
to SP2.
(b) For each refereei (i ∈ [1, n] \ T ), it will
detect that it has received random value
(not well-formed ciphertext), thus sends a
reject message to SP2
6. When SP2 has received t decrypted shares
(P 1...tKu
priv−V E
), it can then recover Kupriv−V E .
From there on, it can use Kupriv−V E to recover
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
.
6 Discussion
In this section, an informal security analysis is pro-
vided to show how the detailed FSSO-PIEMC proto-
cols (with and without trusted ARM) have achieved
the security requirements detailed in section 2.1. How
well these protocols have achieved the minimum on-
line computations property is discussed in the next
section.
6.1 Analysis of FSSO-PIEMC with trusted
ARM
Given the threat environment detailed in section 2.2,
the FSSO-PIEMC protocol with a trusted ARM
achieves the multiple conditions, zero-knowledge, in-
direct enforcement of conditions, authenticated PII
escrow, conditions-abuse resistant, and forward se-
crecy properties as long as (1) the extended TPM
platform behaves and processses Module1 as it is ex-
pected to, and (2) the underlying cryptographic prim-
itives used are correct and secure, and (3) the ARM
behaves honestly.
In accordance to the threat model specified in sec-
tion 2.2, we further specify the actions that malicious
users, IdPs, and SPs may do:
• A malicious user u′a may provide false PII (for
escrow)
• As the PII escrow is ultimately bound to a set
of conditions, the easiest way to compromise the
system is to attempt to bind the escrowed PII
with a set of easy-to-fulfill conditions (for the SPs
and IdPs) or hard-to-fulfill conditions (for users).
Therefore, we consider the following actions:
– u′a may use a hard-to-fulfill Conditions-
x’ during execution of Module1, which is
not the same with Conditions-x originally
agreed with an SPx
– An SPx may provide an easy-to-fulfill
Conditions-x’ to an IdP which is not the
same with Conditions-x originally agreed
with a user ua
– Similarly, an IdP may give an easy-to-fulfill
Conditions-x’ to the ARM which is not the
same with the one originally agreed between
a user and an SPx.
• A malicious IdP or SP may attempt to start
the revocation stage by asking the ARM to ex-
tract a decryption key based on a correct but
not-satisfied Conditions-x, or a false but easy-to-
fulfill Conditions-x’.
Recall that the ARM is trusted in this variant of the
protocol.
Multiple conditions The Multiple conditions
property is achieved due to the re-encryption prop-
erty of an IBEPRE encryption scheme, the CRPI
capability of the anonymous credential system used
(Bangerter et al. 2004), as well as the provable iso-
lated execution of Module1.
During the PII escrow stage, a user’s PII, say
ma...mc, are encrypted using a user-generated one-
time VE key. The corresponding private key
Kupriv−V E is later encrypted using an IBEPRE en-
cryption scheme by executing Module1 on the user’s
extended TPM platform. The provable isolated ex-
ecution of an extended TPM platform allows one to
verify that a given output is the result of a correct iso-
lated execution of a known integrity-verified module,
based on a given set of verified inputs.
Therefore, given the one-time VE public key
Kupub−V E , the conditions Conditions-X, and the pub-
lic parameters for IBEPRE, the output of Module1,
CipherConditions−xIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
must be an IBEPRE en-
cryption of the corresponding private key Kupriv−V E
under Conditions-X : this is because at step P1.2
of Module1 (see Table 1), the retrieved private key
Ku
′
priv−V E is checked against the input public key
Kupub−V E to verify that it is the correct private key to
encrypt. If for some reasons the retrieved Ku
′
priv−V E
has been altered (such as due to storing it in an in-
secure storage area), the step P1.2 verification will
fail.
A malicious user u′a may also use invalid IBEPRE
public parameters and conditions to Module1. How-
ever, such actions can be detected from the signed
proof that the TPM returns - which includes the in-
put and output parameters - see (McCune et al. 2008)
for details. Modifications of the codes of Module1 will
also be detected in the similar manner.
Therefore, if CipherConditions−xIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
correctly
encrypts Kupriv−V E , then the re-encrypted cipher-
text CipherConditions−x2IBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
generated by an ARM
must also hide the same key Kupriv−V E , but this time
under Conditions-X2, due to the re-encryption prop-
erty of an IBEPRE scheme and due to the assumption
that the ARM is honest. As the user’s PII can only be
decrypted using Kupriv−V E , and as K
u
priv−V E can be
re-encrypted multiple times, each bound to a different
set of conditions, we have therefore indirectly bound
the encrypted PII to multiple sets of conditions. In
addition, the FSSO-PIEMC protocol is designed such
that users and SPs can either have a set of pre-agreed
conditions, or have the conditions determined on-line
as an FSSO session starts.
Due to these reasons, we therefore argue that the
detailed FSSO-PIEMC in section 4 achieves the Mul-
tiple Conditions property.
Zero-knowledge This property is achieved due to
the confidentiality protection property of the VE and
IBEPRE encryption schemes. Given that the VE en-
cryption is secure - see (Camenisch & Shoup 2003a)
for security proofs - the IdPs and SPs, who possess
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
... Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
will not be able to
recover ma...mc as they do not have the associated
decryption key Kupriv−V E .
Similarly, given that the IBEPRE encryption used
- such as (Green & Ateniese 2007, Chu & Tzeng 2007,
Matsuo 2007) - is secure, the IdPs and SPs who pos-
sess CipherConditions−XIBEPRE−Ku
priv−V E
(and its re-encrypted
values) will not be able to recover Kupriv−V E as they
do not have the necessary decryption keys.
The value ofKupriv−V E can only be recovered when
the ARM provides the corresponding decryption key
to an authorised entity. As the ARM is honest, a
decryption key, say skConditions-X can only be re-
covered when the ARM is satisfied that the associ-
ated set of conditions Conditions-X is fulfilled, and
that the entity requesting the decryption is the same
as the one stated in Conditions-X. In other words,
Kupriv−V E (and subsequently ma...mc) can only be
recovered by an authorized SP. This property fits our
definition of the zero-knowledge property.
Indirect Enforcement of Conditions This prop-
erty is achieved due to the property of any identity-
based encryption scheme: given an id1 as the pub-
lic encryption key, the Extract operation will output
the decryption key skid1 that is valid for id1 only. In
our FSSO-PIEMC protocol, the enforcement of con-
ditions is exercised during the revocation stage. If a
malicious SPx gives an unfulfilled, but correct, set of
conditions, say Conditions-x to the ARM , an honest
ARM will verify that Conditions-x are not satisfied,
thus refuse to provide the decryption key.
If the SPx provides a bogus set of easy-to-fulfill
conditions, say Conditions-x’, the ARM may verify
that the conditions are satisfied, and thus release the
decryption key skconditions−x′ . However, this decryp-
tion key is useless because Kupriv−V E was encrypted
under Conditions-x which can only be decrypted us-
ing skconditions−x 6= skconditions−x′ .
Therefore, given that ARM is an honest entity, the
proposed FSSO-PIEMC protocol achieves the indirect
enforcement of conditions property.
Authenticated PII escrow This property is
achieved due to the CRPI property from the anony-
mous credential system (Bangerter et al. 2004), as
well as the multiple conditions property that our pro-
posed FSSO-PIEMC protocol provides. The CRPI
property (see Introduction) allows users’ PII to be
encrypted in such way that the recipient can ver-
ify if the given ciphertext correctly encrypts some
user’s PII that have been certified by a trusted cer-
tificate issuer. A successful execution of PII-escrow
stage means that the IdP is convinced that the re-
ceived Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
... Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
indeed hide
ma...mc.
Combined with the multiple conditions property
of FSSO-PIEMC (explained earlier), when one of the
associated set of conditions is satisfied, an SP will be
able to recover a correct Kupriv−V E , which can thus
be used to recover ma...mc successfully.
Conditions-Abuse resistant The proposed
FSSO-PIEMC with trusted ARM achieves the
conditions-abuse resistance property due to the
design of the key-escrow and the multiple-binding
stage, as well as the indirect enforcement of condi-
tions property explained earlier. In step 7 of the
key-escrow stage, the ARM verifies the generated
TPM proof of correct execution of Module1. If
u′a used wrong Conditions-x’ as input to Module1,
then the validation of the proof will fail because the
ARM will use, as one of its inputs, the value of
Conditions-x provided by the IdP in validating the
TPM proof.
Similarly, if the ARM receives a wrong set of con-
ditions Conditions-x’ (either due to the SP giving
wrong conditions Conditions-x’ to the IdP, or directly
from the IdP itself), the validation of the TPM proof
will also fail as the ARM will use the the incorrect
Conditions-x’ value as one of the inputs in verifying
the given TPM proof. The TPM-proof validation will
only succeed if the given condition string from the IdP
is exactly the same as the one the user used as input
to Module1.
During the multiple binding stage, steps 4 to
8 ensure that the VE private key is correctly re-
encrypted to the correct conditions. Assume we need
to re-encrypt an IBEPRE encrypted Kupriv−V E from
Conditions-x to Conditions-y. In step 4, if the IdP
has given an invalid Conditions-x’, the ARM will be
able to detect it and stops the protocol execution.
In steps 5-7, if the IdP has given an invalid condi-
tions Conditions-y’, the user ua will be able to de-
tect it too (signature verification fails). Therefore, a
re-encryption of Kupriv−V E will not be performed un-
less the SP and IdP provides valid Conditions-x and
Conditions-y to the ARM .
Finally, as shown earlier, the indirect enforcement
of conditions property prevents malicious SPs or IdPs
from providing either correct but not fulfilled, or in-
correct but easy-to-fulfill conditions to the ARM for
PII revocation purpose.
Due to these reasons, and since the ARM is hon-
est, we therefore argue that the proposed FSSO-
PIEMC protocol also achieves the Conditions-abuse
resistant property.
Forward secrecy This property is achieved due to
the one-time use property of the VE key in FSSO-
PIEMC, and also due to the non-deterministic nature
of the VE encryption scheme (Camenisch & Shoup
2003b). Informally, given the same message to en-
crypt, a non-deterministic encryption scheme pro-
duces a different encryption result for each round of
encryption.
Assume an SPx who has successfully revealed
PII mx of a user ua. This SPx also has a collec-
tion of l encrypted PII of many other users: C =
Cipher
K
u
1....l
pub−V E
V E−ma,...mz
Assume that in this collection, a
subset of it is made up of h encryptions of the same
PII mx of user ua encrypted under different one-time
VE keys: E = Cipher
K
u
1...h
pub−V E
V E−mx
(E ⊂ C). The for-
ward secrecy property is violated if an SP can pick out
the subset E from C while knowing only mx. How-
ever, as each encryption of mx uses a different VE
key, and due to the non-deterministic nature of the
VE scheme, the resulting ciphertext Cipher
K
u1
pub−V E
V E−mx
should be indistinguishable from another ciphertext
Cipher
K
u2
pub−V E
V E−mx
of the same mx but encrypted using
a different key Ku2pub−V E , or, from another ciphertext
Cipher
K
y1
pub−V E
V E−my
, which is an encryption of a different
data item my of different user. Of course, this also
means that users must generate the one-time VE keys
randomly.
Therefore, assuming that users choose their one-
time VE keys in a random manner, the forward se-
crecy property as defined in section 2.1 is achieved.
6.2 Analysis of FSSO-PIEMC without
trusted ARM
Given the threat environment detailed in section 2.2,
the FSSO-PIEMC protocol without a trusted ARM
achieves the multiple conditions, zero-knowledge, in-
direct enforcement of conditions, authenticated PII
escrow, conditions-abuse resistance, and forward se-
crecy properties as detailed in section 2.1 as long as
(1) the extended TPM platform behaves as it is ex-
pected to, (2) the underlying cryptographic primitives
used are correct and secure, and (3) there is at least
one honest referee in the designated group of referees
T .
In addition to the actions that malicious users,
IdPs, and SPs can do detailed in section 6.1, we also
add the following allowable actions of malicious ref-
erees:
• Malicious referees in Rdh may state that a set of
conditions is satisfied while it actually is not.
• Malicious referees may provide a set of invalid yet
easy-to-fulfill conditions to all referees in R in the
hope of gathering enough t decrypted shares to
recover Kupriv−V E .
Multiple conditions The Multiple conditions
property is achieved due to the provable isolated ex-
ecution of Module1. During the PII escrow stage, a
user’s PII, say ma...mc, are encrypted using a one-
time VE key, whose private key portion is later en-
crypted using the UCH encryption scheme by the ex-
ecution of Module2 on the user’s extended TPM plat-
form. Similar arguments as provided in section 6.1
applies: step P2.2 (see Table 2) ensures that the out-
put of Module2 correctly encrypts the correct VE pri-
vate key in relation to the input public key Kupub−V E .
Invalid input (such as providing invalid Conditions’,
or invalid public keys of the referees) will also be de-
tected through the verification of the provided TPM
proof.
The multiple binding stage is simply a new encryp-
tion of Kupriv−V E under new conditions. Therefore, it
again relies on the provable isolated execution of the
user’s extended TPM platform to behave correctly.
The FSSO-PIEMC without trusted ARM also allows
users and SPs to have either pre-agreed conditions, or
have the conditions determined on-line as an FSSO
session starts.
Zero-knowledge This property is achieved due to
the confidentiality protection provided by the VE
and UCH encryption schemes. Given that the VE
encryption (Camenisch & Shoup 2003a) is secure,
the IdPs and SPs, who possess Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−ma
...
Cipher
Kupub−V E
V E−mc
will not be able to recover ma...mc
as they do not have the associated decryption key
Kupriv−V E . Similarly, given that the UCH encryption
used (Liu et al. 2005) is secure, the IdPs and SPs who
possess ψ will not be able to recover Kupriv−V E .
The value ofKupriv−V E can only be recovered when
all t referees in T agree that the associated set of
conditions Conditions-x is fulfilled (since we use the
UCH(t, t, n) encryption scheme), and that the en-
tity requesting the decryption is the same as the one
stated in Conditions-x. As we assume the existence
of at least 1 honest referee in T , it is therefore obvi-
ous that ma...mc can only be recovered by an autho-
rized SP-x : with UCH(t, t, n), we can handle up to
t− 1 dishonest referees. Thus even if referees collude,
they will only get a maximum of only t− 1 decrypted
shares, which are not enough to recover Kupriv−V E .
Indirect Enforcement of Conditions This prop-
erty is achieved due to the encryption under a la-
bel property of the UCH scheme (Liu et al. 2005)
whereby a message is encrypted under a label, in our
case, under a the Conditions-x string. For a success-
ful decryption, the algorithm requires the use of the
same label Conditions-x as used during the encryp-
tion, otherwise, the decryption algorithm will result
in an error.
If an SPx provides a bogus set of easy-to-fulfill con-
ditions, say Conditions-x’, the referees may agree that
the conditions are satisfied. However, the decryption
process will output an error. Similarly, if SPx pro-
vides correct but not satisfied Conditions-x to the ref-
ereees, those referees in Rdh may ‘pretend’ that they
are satisfied, and thus provide the decrypted shares.
However, again, an honest referee will not continue
the decryption process, resulting in not enough shares
to recover Kupriv−V E .
As we assume the existence of at least one honest
referee in T , the indirect enforcement of conditions
property is therefore achieved.
Authenticated PII escrow This property is
achieved through the same reasoning as the one used
in section 6.1.
Conditions-Abuse resistant The proposed
FSSO-PIEMC without trusted ARM achieves the
conditions-abused resistant property due to the prov-
able isolated execution property of user’s extended
TPM platform and the indirect enforcement of
conditions property explained earlier. In step 3-4
of the key escrow (and multiple binding) stage, the
IdP will try to verify the return TPM proof using
the given condition string Conditions-x from the
SP. Therefore, it will be able to detect if the user
has used an incorrect Conditions-x’ as an input to
Module2. Similarly, if an SP sends an incorrect set of
conditions Conditions-x’ to the IdP, the verification
of the TPM proof will also fail. Therefore, the
proposed FSSO-PIEMC protocol also achieves the
conditions-abuse resistant property.
Forward secrecy Similar reasoning as explained in
section 6.1 applies.
7 Performance Analysis of FSSO-PIEMC
We measure the performance of FSSO-PIEMC using
the number of cryptographic operations that have to
be performed by users, IdPs, SPs, ARM , and the
referees. We show that our protocol provides a signif-
icantly better efficiency as compared to the existing
approach (Bangerter et al. 2004).
We base the calculation on the number of sig-
nature creation (Sign), signature verification (Ver-
ify), commitments generations, PK operations for
proving correct commitments (PK-comm), PK op-
erations for proving correct VE encryptions (PK-
VE ), execution of the DAA protocol, the encryptions
(Enc), and decryptions (Dec) operations of the VE
and UCH schemes, and the IBEPRE operations (en-
cryption, decryption, private key extraction, and re-
encryption). Table 3 and Table 4 shows the total
cryptographic operations that have to be performed.
Of these operations, the PK-VE, PK-comm,
Enc(UCH), and DAA, consume the most com-
putational resources as they require numerous
computationally-intensive modular exponentiations
(modex). As an example, based on a rough estimate,
the PK-VE operation requires a prover (e.g. a user)
to perform roughly 10 modex, while a verifier (e.g.
an IdP) needs to perform approximately 13 modex -
see (Camenisch & Shoup 2003b) for details. A UCH
encryption takes approximately 5t modex (t refers to
the number of designated referees in T ).
7.1 Improved Performance with FSSO-
PIEMC
In both variants of the FSSO-PIEMC protocol (with
and without the trusted ARM), the first round inter-
action with an SP triggers the PII escrow and key es-
crow stage. If we use optimization technique whereby
the user and IdP perform the PII escrow stage offline,
then we can deduct ‘d commitments + d VE encryp-
tions + d PK-comm + d PK-VE ’ operations from the
users side, and ‘d PK-Comm + d PK-VE ’ operations
from the IdP side. For each of the next r-round in-
teractions with the other SPs in the session, we only
need to perform the multiple-binding stage. The re-
vocation stage is only invoked as necessary.
FSSO-PIEIMC with trusted ARM In the worst
case scenario, the proposed FSSO-PIEMC suffers
from inefficient first-round operation due to the re-
quired PK-comm, PK-VE, and DAA operations.
However, the efficiency of the subsequent rounds is
massively improved, especially for the users who only
need to do one signature generation and one signa-
ture verification - a very useful property for users with
low-powered devices. Of course, the majority of op-
erations is now transfered to the ARM who has to
perform a re-encryption (which may include a private
key extraction and a re-encryption key generation -
see Appendix A.2) for each of the r SPs. However,
even so, they are all based on efficient elliptic curve
cryptography operations. Besides, it is very likely
that an ARM would operate using a system with a
considerable amount of computational powers. In the
optimum case, the first-round only requires one inten-
sive cryptographic operations: DAA to be performed
between a user and an ARM .
FSSO-PIEIMC without trusted ARM The
worst case scenario performance is roughly equiva-
lent to the FSSO-PIEMC with trusted ARM . How-
ever, for each of the subsequent rounds, while there
is no bottleneck at the ARM (no ARM is involved),
the user has to perform one Enc(UCH) encryption
operation. Providing a protocol that works in a
stronger threat environment (assuming no trusted
ARM) comes at the cost of a decreased performance
at the users’ side.
Players User IdP SP ARM
PII + Key Max d(commit + VE + d(PK-comm 1 Sign + 1 DAA + 1 Sign
Escrow PK-comm + PK-VE ) + + PK-VE ) + 1 Verify + 1 Verify
(1st SP) 1 DAA + 1 Enc(IBEPRE) 2 Sign +
+ 1 Sign 2 Verify
Opt 1 DAA + 2 Sign + 1 Sign + 1 DAA + 1 Sign
1 Enc(IBEPRE) + 1 Sign 2 Verify 1 Verify 1 + Verify
Each of the next 1 Sign + 2 Sign + 1 Sign + 2 Sign + 2 Verify
r SPs 1 Verify 2 Verify 1 Verify + 1 Re-encrypt
Revocation 1 Sign + 1 Verify +
1 Dec(IBEPRE) 1 Extract
+ d Dec(V E)
Table 3: Performance Summary for FSSO-PIEMC with trusted ARM
Players User IdP SP Referee
PII + Key Max d(commit + VE + d(PK-comm + PK-VE ) 1 Sign +
Escrow PK-comm + PK-VE ) + + 1 DAA + 1 Sign + 1 Verify
(1st SP) 1 DAA + 1 Enc(UCH) 2 Verify
+ 1 Sign
Opt 1 DAA + 1 Enc(UCH) + 1 DAA + 1 Sign + 1 Sign +
1 Sign 2 Verify 1 Verify
Each of the next 1 Enc(UCH) + 1 Sign 1 Sign + 1 Verify 1 Sign +
r SPs 1 Verify
Revocation d Dec(V E) 1 Dec(UCH)
Table 4: Performance Summary for FSSO-PIEMC without trusted ARM
Players User IdP SP ARM
FSSO-PIEMC d(PK-comm + PK-VE + d(PK-comm + 1 DAA +
with trusted ARM VE + commit) + 1 DAA PK-VE ) r Re-encrypt
Existing r × d(PK-comm r × d(PK-comm
Approach + PK-VE ) + PK-VE )
FSSO-PIEMC d(PK-comm + PK-VE d(PK-comm +
without ARM + VE + commit) PK-VE ) + 1 DAA
+ 1 DAA + r(Enc(UCH))
Table 5: Performance Comparison between FSSO-PIEMC and existing approach (Bangerter et al. 2004) for
interactions with r-number of SPs in a session
Comparison to Existing appraoch Assume we
need to escrow d-number of PII. In the existing ap-
proach, every single interaction with a different SP
requires the execution of the PII escrow operation:
for d PII to escrow, a user has to generate d commit-
ments and d VE encryptions. In addition, the user
and the SP have to perform d(PK-comm + PK-VE ).
So, if a user in a session interacts with r number of
SPs, a user has to perform rd(commitments + VE +
PK-comm + PK-VE ) operations, while the each SP
has to perform rd(PK-comm+PK-VE ).
To simplify the comparison, let us just consider the
main cryptographic operations: VE, commitments
generations, PK-comm, PK-VE, Enc(UCH), DAA,
and IBEPRE re-encryption. See Table 5 for a sum-
mary of the performance comparison. In comparison
with the existing approach, our FSSO-PIEMC with
trusted ARM improves the performance by roughly
a factor of r: regardless of the number of SPs a
user interacts in a session, both variants of the FSSO-
PIEMC protocol only have to perform the resources-
intensive cryptographic operations (PK-comm, PK-
VE, DAA) once only. While the ARM still has to
perform roughly r IBEPRE re-encryption, it requires
a much less computational resources as compared to
performing rd(commitments + VE + PK-comm +
PK-VE ).
The performance comparison with the FSSO-
PIEMC without trusted ARM appears to be roughly
comparable: while users only have to perform d(PK-
VE + PK-comm + VE + commit), they have to
perform r(Enc(UCH)), which is another resources-
intensive operations. However, our protocol is still an
improvement as we do not need any trusted ARM
anymore.
Such an improved performance is obtained from
using ACS in an FSSO setting, and removing the
need to perform PK by replacing it with the use of
an extended TPM platform whereby the PK oper-
ations can be reduced to only verifying the TPM-
signed PCR registry value, input, output, and other
necessary parameters.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Two variants of FSSO-PIEMC protocols are pro-
posed, with and without trusted ARM , including
their security properties and their performance im-
provement over the existing approach. Future work
involve investigating into the possibility of adding the
use of the extended TPM technology at the SPs, IdPs,
and/or referees’ sides to possibly improve efficiency,
especially during the revocation stage. While at this
stage, in the context of addressing the multiple con-
ditions and trusted ARM problems, we do not see
any substantial performance gains from doing so, fur-
ther research is still required. Another future work in-
volves relaxing the threat model to allow collusion be-
tween users and referees. In the FSSO-PIEMC with-
out trusted ARM , a referee in T who colludes with
users can always reject conditions fulfillment, thus al-
lowing irrevocable users’ PII .
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A Background Material
In this section, some background materials are ex-
plained so that readers can understand how they are
used in the FSSO-PIEMC system. For further details
(including the algorithms and security proofs of the
cryptographic schemes used), readers should consult
the cited references.
A.1 Anonymous Credential System
In an anonymous credential system proposed in
(Bangerter et al. 2004), a certificate Cert issued
to a user ua is a signature of a certificate issuer
CertIssuer over a set of PII (ma....me):
Cert = Sign(ma,mb, ...me;K
CertIssuer
sign ). A Cert in
an anonymous credential system is private to the user.
Therefore, the concept of a ‘certificate’ in an anony-
mous credential system is different from the ‘usual’
certificate (such as X509 certificate). This certificate
can be verified using the certificate issuer public ver-
ification key KCertIssuerverify . In this paper, one of the
most important capabilities of the anonymous cre-
dential system (Bangerter et al. 2004) for a successful
FSSO-PIEMC (the CRPI capability) is explained.
Assume we need to escrow a user’s email ad-
dress and tax file number, represented by the PII
ma and mb, while revealing mc...me to a ser-
vice provider SP1. The PII ma and mb are
first blinded using a commitment scheme: ca =
Commit(ma, r), cb = Commit(mb, r
′). Then, we en-
crypt the value of ma and mb (which are hidden in
ca and cb respectively) using the Camenisch-Shoup
verifiable encryption scheme (VE) (Camenisch &
Shoup 2003a) under an ARM public encryption key,
along with a set of Conditions: Cipher
KARMpublic−V E
V E−ma
=
EncV E(ma;Conditions;K
ARM
public−V E) (similar opera-
tion applied to data item mb).Here, Conditions is
just an input string representing the conditions un-
der which the encrypted PII can be decrypted. Then,
a PK is executed to prove that ca, cb are the commit-
ments of ma,mb contained in Cert issued by a certifi-
cate issuer CertIssuer. Such PK is achieved by using
the proof of knowledge of a signature on committed
messages technique based on one of the Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya signature schemes - see (Camenisch &
Lysyanskaya 2002, 2004) for details. This PK also
proves that Cipher
KARMpublic−V E
V E−ma
and Cipher
KARMpublic−V E
V E−mb
are encryptions of ma,mb hidden in ca, cb, under the
ARM public key. We can denote such PK as follows:
PK{(Cert, ma, mb) : ca = Commit(ma, r) ∧
cb = Commit(mb, r) ∧
V erifySign(ma, .., me; K
CertIssuer
verify ) = 1 ∧
CipherV E−ma = EncCSV E(ma; Conditions;
KARMpublic−V E) ∧
CipherV E−mb = EncCSV E(mb; Conditions;
KARMpublic−V E)} (5)
At the end of the above PK, SP1 will (or will
not) be convinced that the escrowed PII hidden in
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−ma contain the
correct ma and mb w.r.t Cert, while not learning the
plaintext value of ma or mb. However, note that
CipherCSV E−ma and CipherCSV E−mb are strictly
bound to Conditions - hence the multiple conditions
problem. Our FSSO-PIEMC addresses this problem.
A.2 Identity-based Proxy Re-encryption
Scheme
An identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) allows
the use of arbitrary string (called id) as the public
key to encrypt a message. A proxy re-encryption
scheme (PRE) allows a person (normally called a
‘proxy’) who possesses a correct re-encryption key to
transform a ciphertext CipherAPRE−m encrypted un-
der an entity A to another ciphertext CipherBPRE−m
encrypted under another entity B’s public key with-
out the proxy learning the value of m. We de-
note such a re-encryption key rkA→B . There-
fore, an identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme
(IBEPRE) scheme allows a proxy who has the re-
encryption key rkid1→id2 to transform a ciphertext
Cipherid1IBEPRE−m to Cipher
id2
IBEPRE−m.
As defined in (Green & Ateniese 2007), an
IBEPRE scheme consists of the following operations:
• Setup(1λ, MaxLevels): on input of a secu-
rity parameter 1λ and MaxLevels (the maximum
number of consecutive re-encryptions allowed),
outputs the public system parameters params
and master secret key msk.
• KeyGen(params, msk, id): on input of the sys-
tem parameters, master secret key, and an iden-
tity id ∈ {0, 1}∗, outputs the secret decryption
key skid for the corresponding id.
• Encrypt(params, id, m): on input of a mes-
sage to encrypt m, params, and an id, output
CipheridIBEPRE−m.
• Decrypt(params, skid, Cipher
id
IBEPRE−m):
on input of a ciphertext CipheridIBEPRE−m, the
secret decryption key skid, and system param-
eters params, output the decrypted message m
or ⊥.
• RKGen(params, skid1, id1, id2): on input of
the system parameters params, two identities
id1, id2, and the secret decryption key skid1 cor-
responding to id1, outputs a re-encryption key
rkid1→id2
• Reencrypt(params, rkid1→id2,
Cipherid1IBEPRE−m): on input of a re-encryption
key rkid1→id2 , a ciphertext Cipher
id1
IBEPRE−m
encrypted under id1, and system parameters
params, outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext
Cipherid2IBEPRE−m encrypted under id2
Several existing IBEPRE schemes include (Green &
Ateniese 2007, Chu & Tzeng 2007, Matsuo 2007, Shao
et al. 2008). While they have different algorithms
and varying security protections, they have more or
less the same set of operations as defined above. The
use of IBEPRE in the FSSO-PIEMC system is such
that any IBEPRE schemes that provide the above six
main operations with chosen ciphertext security can
be used.
A.3 Universal Custodian-Hiding Encryption
(UCH)
Consider a set of public parameters: for i = 1, ..., n,
there exists (1) a group N consisting of n members
and their corresponding public keys Kmemberipub−UCH , and
(2) spontaneously chosen values of t and k, such that
1 ≤ k ≤ t ≤ n, and (3) a label (such us a condi-
tion string Conditions). To encrypt a message m
using the UCH scheme (Liu et al. 2005) under the
label Conditions, a user ua spontaneously designates
t members of N to form a group T (T ∈ N). The
UCH scheme (Liu et al. 2005) allows one to encrypt
m such that any k out of the t designated members
of T have to work together to decrypt it, while hid-
ing the identity of the members of T . If all members
of T have to work together (k = t), then we have
UCH(t, t, n). The identities of the members of T are
hidden, that is, a recipient of the ciphertext will not
be able to learn which of the members of N have been
spontaneously chosen by ua to be the member of T .
A user ua can form the group T consisting of different
members with each encryption.
For members of T , t well-formed ciphertext pieces
will be generated, each encrypted using the corre-
sponding member’s public keys. For members of
N /∈ inT , n−t random values are chosen from specific
domains such that they are indistinguishable from
the well-formed ones. Regardless, there will be a to-
tal of n ciphertext pieces (well-formed + random):
Cipher
Kspub−UCH−Enc,Conditions
UCH(k,t,n)−m +random
r (for s ∈ T ,
and r ∈ [1, n]\T ). This encryption scheme also has its
corresponding zero-knowledge proof (PK) system to
prove that these n ciphertext pieces correctly encrypt
m in relation to some known values γ and δ, such
that γm = δ, and that at least k members of T have
to work together to decrypt it without the verifier
learning the identity of the members of T . However,
as we shall see in section 5, with the use of trusted
computing technologies, we do not have to execute
the UCH’s PK in the proposed FSSO-PIEMC pro-
tocol. Further details of this encryption scheme are
provided in (Liu et al. 2005). We will also show how
UCH can be used in our FSSO-PIEMC protocol to
address the trusted ARM problem.
A.4 Secure Computing Platform
Trusted computing hardware allows one to reasonably
assure that a system will behave as it is expected to,
and that it will enforce some security policies (con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability) even in the pres-
ence of some physical or logical interference (Mitchell
2005, Reid 2007). An example of such hardware in-
cludes trusted platform module (TPM), secure pro-
cessor, and smartcard.
TPM A TPM (TCG 2007) is a small silicon de-
vice that is embedded to a computer device. A TPM
securely stores certificates, encryption and signature
keys, and passwords. A TPM can perform crypto-
graphic functions, generate random numbers, and,
most importantly for our FSSO-PIEMC protocol, al-
low the attestation of the platform software configu-
ration’s integrity. When a software module is loaded,
its cryptographic hash value (or ‘fingerprint’) is calcu-
lated and added to the Platform Configuration Regis-
ter (PRC) component inside a TPM. A remote entity
can verify if a correct software module is loaded by
verifying the value of the PCR register, signed by the
TPM.
Each genuine TPM is required by the standard
(TCG 2007) to have an embedded (asymmetric) en-
dorsement key EK which never leaves the TPM
shielded environment. To prove that a TPM is gen-
uine, the TPM has to prove the knowledge of this
EK. For privacy, we only want an entity to learn
that it is interacting with a genuine TPM, but not
exactly which TPM, otherwise, each interaction can
be trivially linked. However, in achieving many of
the TPM services, a TPM needs to have an authen-
ticated signature key pair so that messages that it
produces can be verified. For example, to verify if a
given PCR value is valid, the TPM has to sign the
PCR value using its authenticated signing key. If pri-
vacy is a concern, then a different signature key pair
has to be generated for each session. To convince
a party that the per-session generated signature key
pair (also known as Attestation Identity Key AIK)
is generated from a valid TPM, a technique has been
developed to allow a TPM to prove the link between
the generated AIK with the embedded EK (which
confirms the status of a genuine TPM) without the
verifier learning the value of the EK (Chen 2005).
Such a technique is called the Direct Anonymous At-
testation - DAA (Brickell et al. 2004).
Therefore, by using DAA (Brickell et al. 2004), one
can generate many per-session AIKs, thus achiev-
ing the unlinkability property amongst TPM trans-
actions. AIK is a signature key, and should never
be used for encryption, and should only be used to
sign messages generated internally by a TPM, which
includes a PCR value.
Secure Processor Using TPM alone is not suffi-
cient to provide a reasonable trust in the computer
behavior because it suffers from the time-of-check
to time-of-use problem: successful verification of the
TPM-signed PCR register value only shows that the
software module was loaded correctly. However, it
does not ‘prove’ that during the execution, the in-
tegrity of the loaded module is still intact. An ad-
versary may be able to compromise the integrity of
the loaded software module between the PCR-value
checking and execution of the module.
To address this problem, we need a secure envi-
ronment that allows a module, once loaded, to be
protected from dynamic runtime attacks. In other
words, we need an isolated execution environment,
and the ability to prove that a set of outputs is indeed
the result of correct isolated execution of an integrity-
verified module based on a set of given inputs. In
essence, the proof required to convince a verifier of
such an execution is generated by signing the PCR
value of the module loaded into the isolated execution
environment, the input values given to this module,
and the output generated from the execution of this
module in the isolated execution environment. These
values are signed using the TPM AIK signing key. A
verifier, who knows the hash value of the executed
module, the input and the output values, should be
able to verify the correctness of the given proof by
verifying the signature using the corresponding AIK’s
signature verification key. We call this property prov-
able isolated execution. For an example, see (McCune
et al. 2008, Section 4.4).
This capability normally works in conjunction
with a TPM, and has already been provided by most
of the current processors, such as AMD’s Secure Vir-
tual Machine, Intel’s TXT Technology (Intel 2007),
and Flicker (McCune et al. 2008). We call such a
TPM platform, which works with secure processor to
provide the provable isolated execution property, an
extended TPM platform.
Smart-card and TPM A smartcard has many
similarities to a TPM: it can store cryptographic keys,
user credentials, perform cryptographic operations, as
well as executing applets. Despite these similarities,
some features of a TPM are not available in a smart
card. In this paper, we require a system that can ver-
ify the integrity of few security-critical modules sat-
isfying the provable isolated execution property. Such
a feature, while theoretically possible on smart card,
has only been provided by an extended TPM plat-
form.
Nevertheless, smart card and TPM should not
be seen as competing technologies. Instead, they
are complementary (Dell 2004, George 2004). There
could be a role that a smart card could play in en-
hancing the security and, possibly, efficiency of an
FSSO-PIEMC system. However, it is beyond the in-
tended scope of this paper to provide such details.
